俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年3月12日

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Institute for the Study of War
& The Critical Threats Project
2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan
March 12, 8 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily
by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 12. This report establishes a
comprehensive timeline of the rivalry between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which likely reached a boiling point over Bakhmut. The
report also analyzes the Russian MoD’s likely intent to expend Wagner forces in Bakhmut and
explores Russian President Vladimir Putin’s manipulation of this conflict to maintain the
stability of his regime.
The conflict between the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier
Yevgeny Prigozhin likely reached its climax against the backdrop of the Battle of Bakhmut. The
Russian MoD specifically Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff
General Valery Gerasimov is likely seizing the opportunity to deliberately expend both elite and convict Wagner
forces in Bakhmut in an effort to weaken Prigozhin and derail his ambitions for greater influence in the Kremlin.
The Russian MoD had been increasingly restricting Prigozhin’s ability to recruit convicts and secure ammunition,
forcing Prigozhin to publicly recognize his dependency on the Russian MoD. Prigozhin, for example, publicly
complained that he mailed a letter and tried to send his representative likely to Shoigu and Gerasimov with
an urgent demand for ammunition, but that the representative was not allowed to present his complaints.
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Prigozhin had been able to grow his forces by 40,000 convicts likely with the Kremlin’s permission to recruit in
prisons in 2022 but lost that permission and access to that manpower pool at the beginning of 2023.
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Prigozhin
has threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut and insinuated that the Russian MoD used Wagner to
bear the brunt of the high-intensity attritional urban warfare to seize Bakhmut in order to conserve Russian
conventional forces.
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These threats and complaints indicate that Prigozhin is aware of the gravity of his conflict
with the Russian MoD.
The Russian military leadership may be trying to expend Wagner forces and Prigozhin’s
influence in Bakhmut. Russian forces’ rate of advance in Bakhmut slowed following the Ukrainian
withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut around March 7.
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ISW assessed on March 6 that Wagner had to commit its
elite forces to maintain offensive momentum in Bakhmut but may be running out of these forces during direct
assaults on eastern, southern, and northern parts of Bakhmut.
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Geolocated footage published on February 18
showed 43 buses with Wagner mercenaries moving from Crimea via Melitopol possibly to reinforce positions in
Bakhmut.
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Prigozhin complained on March 5 and 6 that Wagner needed additional reinforcements, and
Ukrainian military officials observed that Russian forces were suffering a seven-to-one casualty ratio compared
to Ukrainian forces.
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Prigozhin likely anticipated that Ukrainian forces would entirely withdraw from Bakhmut out of fear of imminent
encirclement and hoped that his commitment of Wagner’s elite forces would be sufficient to generate that effect.
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