Landpower Essay
No. 06-2
September 2006
An Institute of Land Warfare Publication
The Landpower Essay series is published by AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare. The series is designed to provide an outlet for
original essays on topics that will stimulate professional discussion and further public understanding of the landpower aspects
of national security. The content represents the personal opinions of the author and not necessarily the position of the Associa-
tion of the United States Army or its members. Candidate essays of 5,000 words or less may be submitted to: AUSA’s Institute
of Land Warfare, ATTN: Landpower Essay Series, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201. For more information about
AUSA and the Institute of Land Warfare, visit our website at www.ausa.org.
Lessons from the Past:
Making the Army’s Doctrine “Right Enough” Today
by
Huba Wass de Czege
Introduction
No doctrine is perfect, but getting it “right enough” is strategically important. Dire consequences
followed for France in the spring of 1940 because heavy investments in its high-tech Maginot
Line failed against the German Blitzkrieg. French doctrine was based on awed post-World War I
interpretations of technological change and its impact on the nature of war. We also have learned
from recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq that operating without applicable doctrine can have
strategic consequences, and that the intuition of senior generals is of little value in the councils
of state today. The quickly submerged November 2002 public dispute between Army Chief of
Staff General Eric Shinseki and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz about the number
of Soldiers required for the coming invasion of Iraq is often recalled to vilify the civilian side, but
no one can claim that the resulting campaign violated accepted joint or Army doctrinal precepts.
In fact, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted according to widely supported
emerging concepts within the Department of Defense (DoD). We should take little comfort that
events are proving the former Army Chief more right than wrong. Politicians are more likely to
respect the intuition of senior Army leaders when they render judgments backed by a sound body
of doctrine, especially one that is also respected and supported by the other services.
The lessons from the Army’s struggle to get the doctrine “right enough” after Vietnam are
worth heeding as the present generation carries out the current revision of the service’s capstone
operational doctrine. Because there are important parallels between the current period of military
reform and the one just previous that began in 1973, ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the lessons are relevant and numerous.
Achieving a “right enough” result took 13 years, and two Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations, revisions—published in 1976 and 1982—were short of the mark; the 1986 manual
