1
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
11 October 2006
Introduction
How best to translate strategic objectives into tactical action has long
been a topic of discussion and debate among military professionals. In
recent years new theories have been espoused, including the “Effects-
Based Approach” (EBA) put forward by U.S. Joint Forces Command and
“Systemic Operational Design” (SOD) advanced by retired Israeli
brigadier general Shimon Naveh. While these theories claim to offer
substantial advantage to the user, many readers find their content murky
and the problem they seek to overcome unclear. A number of authors
have explored the issue by examining historical events. Specifically,
within the past few years several histories have scrutinized the design for
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and the methods by which it
was developed and implemented. These include Plan of Attack by Bob
Woodward, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of
Iraq by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, and Fiasco: The
American Military Adventure in Iraq, by Thomas E. Ricks. Books on
operations in Iraq abound, but the authors of these three works enjoy
professional reputations that resulted in an uncommon level of access to,
and insight from, key participants and documents at all echelons.
Additionally, in the past few months several retired general officers have
commented publicly on the guidance and direction provided by the
Secretary of Defense relative to OIF, spawning a series of news items,
editorials, and professional journal articles commonly referenced as the
“Revolt of the Generals.” Whether espoused for theoretical, historical,
altruistic or political purposes, collectively these works infer that there is
some significant problem—doctrinal, organizational, procedural,
educational, cultural, or personality driven—with the way in which the
United States establishes strategic aims and orchestrates the elements of
national power to achieve them.
So far there is little consensus on the true nature of the problem, even
while ongoing operations in Iraq generate momentum for change—
change that may be premature. There is a school of thought that believes
the fundamental problem is a failure of intelligence compounded by
