© 2011, Small Wars Foundation August 7, 2011
Unity of Effort? Or, Command?
by Michael J. Forsyth
In spite of the outstanding efforts of all our soldiers and civilians in the war in
Afghanistan, there are two central problems that continue to reduce our effectiveness there.
First, until recently there has been little continuity between the succeeding joint task force
headquarters in Afghanistan -- we have had eleven since late 2001. Each succeeding joint task
force headquarters tends to have a different vision regarding the character of the fight from the
one it replaced. Second, compounding this problem, there is no unity of command in the area of
operation (AO) among military units and the various U.S. Government agencies operating on the
battlefield, with many of the civilian entities operating without coordinating with the military
chain of command. Both of these problems create operational weaknesses affecting continuity
of strategy and execution of operations. The combination of these two factors creates a
pendulum effect in terms of policy and sends conflicting messages to the Afghan populace as
well as our own personnel. Moreover, it creates an unhealthy tension and competitiveness
between military and civilian governmental organizations that can cause friction throughout an
operation. Both of these problems are solvable if we modify the way we deploy major unit
headquarters and eliminate the ambiguity of command relationships in theater that enable side-
stepping the critical principle of unity of command. This article will address these problems in
more depth, and conclude with recommendations to remedy the issues identified.
Too Many Headquarters over Time Creates Disunity of Effort
As of June 2011 the Unites States military will have seen its eleventh rotation of
headquarters and troops in Afghanistan. Each major headquarters in Afghanistan at the joint task
force or theater level is composed of a division or corps headquarters. Each deploys for a
specified amount of time, ranging from twelve to fifteen months. Over the course of ten years in
Afghanistan we have witnessed eleven different major headquarters. Such rotations have not
always been the case historically. In most previous American wars, headquarters and
commanders have remained intact for the duration. Examples include General Dwight D.
Eisenhower with his combined headquarters in World War II in the 20
th
Century. In the 19
th
Century Lieutenant General Winfield Scott led the army from the beginning of the Mexican War
through the occupation phase at the end of hostilities. Only in recent times have our forces
conducted routine rotations of headquarters and commanders.
The purpose of rotating headquarters arises from political and practical considerations.
From a political perspective it would not be feasible to deploy units – which are composed of
individual soldiers with families – for much longer than a year because the American people
Nadia Schadlow, “From the Jaws of Victory,” The Wall Street Journal Online. 7 February 2008: A19. Web. 15 February 2008.
SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com
