DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-2000
OPNAVINST 3900.30
N4
13 Jun 2018
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3900.30
From: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: NAVY CAPABILITY PROTECTION CELL
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5450.352A
(b) SECNAVINST 3850.2E
(c) 50 U.S.C §4565
(d) DoD Instruction 2000.25 of 5 August 2010
1. Purpose. Per references (a) through (d), this instruction establishes policy and issues
responsibilities for the Navy Capability Protection Cell (NCPC) to assess those areas where
adversaries are most aggressively targeting the Navy’s warfighting advantage and to coordinate
strategic courses of action (COA) to safeguard Navy equities.
2. Background. The Navy is faced with increasingly complex challenges to protect equities
such as critical technologies and infrastructure, supply chains, and sensitive missions, training,
and testing on Navy bases and ranges, from incursion, influence, and malign-intent. Global
competitors, such as China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and others, are strategically using the
global economic commons to negatively impact U.S. military advantage; threaten American
resiliency, critical infrastructure, and technological advantage; and encroach upon U.S. military
testing and training areas and the Navy must account for this reality. NCPC is established to
ensure continuity of awareness of these concerns, and recommend mitigation strategies across
staffs of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV); Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV); Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command; and Commander, Pacific Fleet.
3. Scope
a. This instruction provides the organizational construct to facilitate the sharing of
information among NCPC members who have identified threats through traditional analyses and
to address modern challenges falling outside the scope of a traditional OPNAV code for action.
The intent is to identify any strategies used by countries of concern to exploit vulnerabilities in
existing foreign investment vetting processes and regulations. Examples of non-traditional
emerging challenges include: foreign investment transactions involving sophisticated peer and
near-peer state competitors; malign non-state actors; countries of concern access to advanced or
disruptive technologies; and proximity to Navy training, testing, and operating areas within the
United States and overseas.
