The Long War: Four Views
By
Joseph J. Collins
Journal Article |
Jan 5 2015 - 6:29pm
The Long War: Four Views
Joseph J. Collins
While the Long War continues to march, four new books have presented challenging and sometimes
contradictory conclusions about the war and its lessons for the future. This review essay looks at: the
memoir of a Secretary of Defense, a recent RAND study, the
cri de coeur
of a retired general, and the
memoir of a combat veteran and leading
coindinista.
What follows is not just a review essay, but also an
exploration of lessons encountered, but not yet learned. It ends with a call for help from the
Small Wars
Journal
readership.
Robert Gates’s memoir,
Duty: the Memoirs of a Secretary at War
made tremendous splash
[1]
for its hard-
but-fair critique of two Presidents, the firing of a few generals, its blow-by-blow description of the battle
inside the Pentagon to improve support to war-fighters, and, surprise to many, the emotional bond that this
tough secretary forged with the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lost in the many great vignettes and
secretarial sea stories is the fact that the last chapter of this book, “Reflections,” is a mini-war college, full
of the kind of wisdom that can only come from years of strategic analysis, and a world class resume:
Deputy National Security Advisor, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, President of Texas A&M, and
Secretary of War for two Presidents with vastly different styles and priorities. Gates’s take-aways are a
short-course in strategy for future leaders.
Gates defends the Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and lauds Presidents Bush and Obama for commanding
and not just presiding over the Armed Forces. Gates criticizes “more and more senior officers” who “seek
a high public profile and … speak out, often on politically sensitive issues or even on matters beyond their
area of responsibility (not to mention, expertise)” (p. 575). His negative examples are Admiral Fox Fallon
and General Stan McChrystal, both of whom were fired for their untimely and unfortunate statements. At
the same time, Gates praises General David Petraeus, a master communicator, for letting improving
operational results in Iraq drive his command’s strategic communications. He also lauds Admiral Mullen
and General Peter Pace, his JCS chairmen, for their support.
Gates highlighted an important problem for future senior officers: dealing with the Congress. The
dysfunctional legislature could not pass in a timely manner any of the five defense budgets that he sent up
to the Hill. He characterized the U.S. Congress as “uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling its basic
constitutional responsibilities…micromanagerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, thin-skinned, often
putting self (and reelection) before country…” (p. 581). While condemning the polarization in the
Congress, he reminded his successors to be bi-partisan and respect individual members. He credits his
senior aide, Robert Rangel, a former HASC staffer, with keeping him sane and focused in congressional
relations, but the Secretary concluded that the Congress “was just another battlefield in my wars” (p. 581).
