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No. 58
August 2025
The Mitchell Forum
Air Force Under Fire: Time To Own Base Defense
by Lt Col Phil Ferris, USAF
Foreword
It was a clear morning, and the sun had just begun to rise over
the air base, casting a golden glow over the rows of aircraft. e base’s
personnel started to bustle around to meet the day’s tasks. In an instant,
the tranquility was shattered by the thunder of explosions and then
the scream of incoming cruise missiles and the buzz of one-way attack
drones. Airmen scattered to try to take cover in the confusion. e base,
not properly prepared or defended, was caught o guard by a surprise air
attack. Even as the strike ended, the sounds of chaos and panic continued
to ll the air as personnel rushed to respond to the disaster, but it was
too late, as the damage was done. Aircraft were damaged or destroyed,
their metal skins torn apart by shrapnel and ames. e base’s fuel storage
facilities were ablaze, its runways cratered and unusable. Worse yet was
the eect on human life; the toll was stunning, with many killed or injured
in the blasts. e results were nothing short of catastrophic.
How had this happened? e Air Force was relying on the Army to
provide protection for the base and assumed the Army’s air defense assets
would be sucient to deter or defeat any potential threats. However, the
Army was stretched thin, its limited assets already committed to supporting
other joint and high-priority missions, and many of the Army’s systems
were too logistically cumbersome to meet the Air Force’s needs. Despite the
Air Force’s requests, the Army was unable to allocate its scarce resources
to defend every air base, leaving many installations, including this one,
vulnerable to attack. As a result, the base faced disastrous consequences.
As the hours turned into days, the true extent of the disaster became
clear: the base was unable to generate combat power sorties, leaving its ability
to project airpower crippled. e once-thriving air base was now a shadow of
its former self, a haunting reminder of the importance of robust defenses and
mitigation measures, as well as the terrible consequences of being unprepared
for the expected. e tragedy served as a stark warning to Air Force leaders:
they should not assume others would provide for their defense.
