© 2010, Small Wars Foundation September 20, 2010
The Mumbo-Jumbo of Design:
Is this the Army’s EBO?
by Andrew B. Nocks
If the early problems of learning design were hampered by the lack of any written accounts of
design methodology, the current problem facing students of design is the proliferation of books,
doctrinal manuals, and journal articles on the subject. While these sources share a common
core, there is significant divergence in terminology, and varied emphasis on the philosophical
versus practical aspects of design. This is actually a very good sign that design discourse is alive
and well, but it can make entry into the subject more daunting.
1
The United States Army (and Joint Community) has been on a Design path before. In
2002, the United States Air Force began its campaign to explain to the broader joint community
the power and value of the emergent concept of Effects-based Operations (EBO). In a condition
setting white paper, it stated upfront that ―…the concept of EBO is not well understood and
requires further elaboration to ensure it is used properly. EBO is not a new form of warfighting,
nor does it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare. EBO is a way of thinking
or a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific
effects required to achieve desired national security outcomes.‖
2
The joint community embraced what the Air Force was selling and EBO began its
proliferation across the services, to include the United States Army. ―While EBO is not a joint or
Army doctrinally approved concept, many commanders have found EBO beneficial, and
incorporated aspects of the concept into their decision-making and staff process. Effects-based
operations is both a way of thinking about operations and a set of processes and procedures for
planning, executing, and assessing operations.‖
3
After a period of several years and continuous
dialogue, discussion and debate internal and external to the Army, in July 2008 General James N.
Mattis, USMC, who commanded the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), issued a decree
that EBO in and of itself was dead as a foundational concept for joint or service operations.
General Mattis stated ―After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in
EBO, ONA,
4
and SoSA
5
have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear
understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational
1
U.S. Army, School of Advanced Military Studies. Student Text, Version 2.0, Art of Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, March 2010): 1.
2
U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command. ACC White Paper: Effects-Based Operations (Langley Air Force Base, VA: Air Combat
Command, 2002): ii.
3
U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned. CALL Handbook 05-19, A Special Study on Effects-Base Approach to Military
Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005): iii.
4
ONA – Operational Net Assessment
5
SoSA – System-of-Systems Analysis
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