© 2010, Small Wars Foundation October 8, 2010
Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis
by Christopher R. Paparone
We can by improvements in our knowledge limit the sovereignty of Fortuna, bitch
goddess of unpredictability; we cannot dethrone her.
--Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue
This is the third article in a series exploring the impact of design philosophy and whether
a military renaissance is potentially afoot.
1
This episode attempts to expose the myth that design
is a ―methodology‖ that leads to ―understanding‖ that eventually leads to good military planning
as suggested in the US Army‘s latest doctrine, particularly its Field Manual 5-0, The Operations
Process. The focus is to reveal the issues associated with ―mission analysis,‖ that is, the
breaking down of a ―problem‖ into manageable tasks that, when all put together into a military
plan or order, serve to solve the overall ―problem.‖ Beyond conventional, ―force-on-force‖
fights, this essay argues that mission analysis is a misconception when it comes to framing
complex operations.
Two contemporary authors have critically reviewed the propensity of the military
community to use the decomposing or ―scientific method‖ to solve problems. Antoine
Bousquet‘s Scientific Way of Warfare traces the roots of ―techno-scientific regimes‖ that have
historically dominated the way we conceive of war – from the machine age to the present frame
around the ―information paradigm.‖
2
He also projects the use of complexity science and chaos
theory as the emergent frame. In her recent monograph, anthropologist Anna Simons deftly
chastises those who seek modern scientific-style cumulative learning into doctrine and TTP (she
coins the terms, ―genericize‖ and the T.E. ―Lawrence Paradox‖ to signify these learning
mythologies).
3
Simons exposes the institutional failure to appreciate the depth of experiential
learning and intuitive forms of ―visioning‖ needed in complex warfare describing how several
famous persons in history envisioned not through a scientific form of learning, but through
immersion into- and the unique development of- local situations.
4
The logic of mission analysis appears quite rational to the Western classical empiricism
mindset: military commanders and staffs can face difficult situations by decomposing them into
definable problems; figure out what tasks (together called ―the mission‖) need to be performed to
solve them; and divide those tasks among subordinates who, in turn, do the same down the line
(from the strategic level to the individual trooper). At the end of the day, the accumulative
1
See ―Design and the Prospects of a Military Renaissance,‖ http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/design-and-the-prospects-
of-a/) and ―Design and the Prospects for Deviant Leadership,‖ http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/09/design-and-the-
prospects-for-d/.
2
Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (NY: Columbia
University, 2009), p. 13.
3
Anna Simons, Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why We Need It (Carlisle, PA: US Army
Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010). ―TTP‖ stands for tactics, techniques, and procedures, assumed by the institution to be
applicable to future situations.
4
Ibid., p. 21.
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