SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com
Operational Design: Promise and Problems
Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke
Approaches to Operational Design have become increasingly prominent in both Army and Joint
contexts.
1
Design, like all doctrines, is a product of specific political, organizational, and
cultural forces, events, and influences both unique to the armed services and external to them. A
product born of the US military’s experience in counterinsurgency and nation-building
campaigns, Design is a process best applied in the planning of campaigns and major operations.
It is part of a general family of ideas inspired by FM 3-0 Operations. There are, however,
substantial risks in the adoption of Design that must be addressed. Additionally, campaigning
needs to be thought of as an aspect of strategy rather than a wholly separate operational level in
order to best implement American strategic objectives.
We will first attempt to define the concept within the prism of recent military doctrine and the
general idea of campaign design. We will then examine the doctrine’s major claims about
complexity in military affairs before moving on to a discussion of concerns over Design vis-a-vis
more traditional planning ideas, and conclude with some recommendations about the evolution
of campaign design in relationship to strategy.
Evolution of a Concept
Given the pace of doctrinal debate and the evolution of the concept, there is dispute over what
Design is and what it constitutes. There has also been a good deal of hype surrounding the
concept that has only grown as defense reporters have become more aware of the issue. Given
the controversy surrounding the subject, we seek to add to the literature by conducting an
assessment of the concept, its strengths and weaknesses, and its larger context.
First, although the Design we talk about is mainly a product of the Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and Combined Arms
Center (CAC), talk about the design of major operations and campaigns has been ongoing since
the 1970s. A consistent theme in recent military theory and doctrine has been an emphasis on the
visualization of the problem prior to (and concurrent with) planning. The Academic Year 2008
Army War College Campaign Planning Handbook, for example, has a section on campaign
design in a joint context focused on framing that echoes much of the language that would later be
1
Sgt. Josh LeChappelin, “Command Releases Approach to Operational Design Vision,” USJFCOM Public Affairs,
October 19, 2009 and General James N. Mattis, “Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design,” October 6,
2009. http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2009/pa101909.html
