JULY 2025
How the United States
Can Overcome Icebreaker
Construction Woes and Grow
the Maritime Industrial Base
By Luke Slivinski
T
he United States has an ongoing and growing national security risk in the Arctic. Due to the
lack of U.S. presence in the region, the country is unable to suciently counter, or even fully
understand, this risk. While Russia’s over 40 polar icebreakers, compared to the United
States’ current three (with only one a true heavy polar icebreaker) may seem like a glaring disparity,
China’s four icebreakers (with a fth on the way) are arguably more distressing. A direct comparison
of icebreaker numbers with Russia is not a fair measure, because Russia has dierent operational
demands in the Arctic (e.g., more ports, waterways, and Arctic area for their icebreakers to service).
However, China is not an Arctic nation, and currently has more polar icebreakers than the United
States—and is likely to continue outpacing the United States’ sluggish icebreaker construction eort.
This constitutes a giant spotlight on the U.S. national security risk in the Arctic.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) polar icebreaker acquisition challenges are well known, having been
the subject of several recent congressional hearings, multiple articles, and a comment recently
made by President Trump about ordering 40 big icebreakers. The USCG’s then–deputy commandant
for operations, Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, and then-deputy commandant for mission support, Vice
Admiral Thomas Allan Jr., testied before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
on November 14, 2024, on the USCG’s icebreaker recapitalization eorts. Those testimonies armed
the U.S. national security risk in the Arctic, the USCG’s need for more ice breaking capacity now, and
the sad state of the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) acquisition program. The continued PSC acquisition
challenges were further acknowledged again by Vice Admiral Allan Jr.’s testimonies before the
